Disqualification of Trial Judges: A Look at DeCastro v. State and the Limits of Judicial Discretion

On March 12, 2025, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal handed down a significant decision in DeCastro v. State, No. 3D23-1523, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 2034 (Fla. 3d DCA, Mar. 12, 2025), a case that underscores the delicate balance judges must maintain when faced with motions to disqualify themselves. Eiffel DeCastro, the appellant, won a reversal of his convictions and sentences, securing a new trial before a different judge—not because the trial judge was necessarily biased, but because the judge overstepped a critical procedural boundary in responding to DeCastro’s motion for disqualification. This ruling serves as a reminder of the strict rules governing judicial impartiality and the consequences of even well-intentioned missteps.

The Case: A Motion Born in the Heat of Trial

DeCastro’s appeal stemmed from a trial where tensions ran high. Mid-trial, his attorney orally moved to disqualify the presiding judge, alleging an appearance of bias. The motion pointed to two specific actions: an ex parte phone call the judge made to the State Attorney’s Office during a victim’s testimony to inquire about the absence of a victim advocate, and perceived favoritism toward State witnesses through comforting statements and accommodations—like offering tissues or breaks. These actions, DeCastro argued, suggested the judge was more concerned with supporting the prosecution’s case than maintaining neutrality.

The judge didn’t take this lying down. In a detailed response, the judge refuted the allegations, explaining that the call was meant to ensure courtroom safety and witness composure, not to favor the State. The judge clarified that offers of water or breaks were standard for any witness in distress, and denied saying “everything is going to be okay” to the victim or her mother. The motion for recusal—and a related motion for a mistrial—was denied on the spot. Later, when DeCastro’s counsel filed a written motion reiterating these claims, the judge reviewed it in chambers and denied it without further comment. DeCastro was convicted, sentenced, and appealed.

The Legal Line Crossed

The Third District Court of Appeal didn’t focus on whether the judge’s actions during trial were inherently biased. Instead, it zeroed in on a procedural error rooted in Florida law: when ruling on an initial motion to disqualify, a judge must assess only the legal sufficiency of the allegations—not their factual accuracy. Citing precedents like Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1978) and Chiu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 So. 3d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), the court emphasized that a judge who “looks beyond the mere legal sufficiency of a suggestion of prejudice and attempts to refute the charges of partiality” has already gone too far. By contesting DeCastro’s version of events, the trial judge inadvertently provided grounds for disqualification, regardless of whether the underlying claims held water.

This rule exists for a reason. Judicial impartiality isn’t just about actual fairness—it’s about the perception of fairness. When a judge engages in a factual tug-of-war with a party seeking disqualification, it risks eroding public confidence in the process. The appellate court made it clear: the judge’s detailed rebuttal was a misstep that necessitated reversal.

Harmless Error? Not This Time

Even when a judge errs in denying a disqualification motion, Florida law applies a “harmless error” test, as defined in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). The State, as the beneficiary of the mistake, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error didn’t affect the verdict. Here, the State didn’t even try to argue harmlessness—a surprising omission. But the court didn’t stop there. It independently reviewed the record and found that the victim’s testimony was pivotal to the State’s case, making her credibility a linchpin of the trial. Any perception of judicial favoritism—real or imagined—could have swayed the jury. Plus, a successor judge could have revisited the original judge’s rulings on evidence and motions, potentially altering the trial’s outcome. With so much at stake, the court couldn’t confidently say the error was harmless.

What It Means

The DeCastro decision doesn’t mean the trial judge was biased or that DeCastro’s allegations were true. In fact, the court explicitly avoided ruling on the motion’s legal sufficiency or the propriety of the judge’s courtroom actions (aside from the response to the motion). The reversal hinged solely on the judge’s procedural error in disputing the facts—a technical but consequential violation of Florida’s judicial rules.

For legal practitioners, this case is a cautionary tale about the limits of judicial engagement. Judges, no matter how well-meaning, must resist the urge to defend their actions when faced with a disqualification motion. For defendants like DeCastro, it’s a rare win in a system where procedural missteps can sometimes tip the scales of justice.

Looking Ahead

DeCastro now gets a fresh start with a new judge, but the broader implications linger. The ruling reinforces Florida’s commitment to the DiGuilio harmless-error standard, rejecting calls to soften it in favor of upholding convictions. It’s a high bar—one that prioritizes fairness over finality. As this case heads back to the trial court, it’ll be worth watching how the new judge navigates the same evidentiary and credibility challenges that defined DeCastro’s first trial.

In the end, DeCastro v. State isn’t about guilt or innocence—it’s about process. And in Florida, when that process falters, even a judge’s good intentions can’t save a verdict.